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1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algo-
rithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in
response to other players’ actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost (profit)
in the network.
We assume that the players’ cost functions are not necessarily dependent on
the actions of all players. This is due to better mimicking the standard social me-
dia rules. A communication graph is defined for the game through which players
are able to share their information with only their neighbors. We assume that
the communication neighbors necessarily affect the players’ cost functions while
the reverse is not always true.
In this game, the players are only aware of their own cost functions and ac-
tions. Thus, each of them maintains an estimate of the others’ actions and share
it with the neighbors to update his action and estimates.
A Nash equilibrium is a point that no player can unilaterally deviate his
action to gain a better profit while the others keep their actions unchanged. In
this work, we do not study the various algorithms within this framework, but
instead, we analyze a specific application of these algorithms in social networks.
Interested readers may refer to [4, 6, 7, 5, 3, 8] for a detailed explanation of such
algorithms.
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1.1 Social Media Behavior
In this section we aim to investigate social networking media for users’ behav-
ior. In such media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram users are allowed to
follow (or be friend with) the other users and post statuses, photos and videos
or also share links and events. Depending on the type of social media, the way
of communication is defined. For instance, in Instagram, friendship is defined
unidirectional in a sense that either side could be only a follower and/or being
followed.
Recently, researchers at Microsoft have been studying the behavioral attitude
of the users of Facebook as a giant and global network [2]. This study can be
useful in many areas e.g. business (posting advertisements) and politics (posting
for the purpose of presidential election campaign).
Generating new status usually comes with the cost for the users such that
if there is no benefit in posting status, the users don’t bother to generate new
ones. In any social media drawing others’ attention is one of the most important
motivation/stimulation to post status [1]. Our objective is to find the opti-
mal rate of posting status for each selfish user to draw more attention
in his network. In the following, we make an information/attention model of
a generic social media [1], define a way of communication between users via a
digraph GC , and mark the interactions between users by an interference digraph
GI .
Consider a social media network of N users. Each user i produces xi unit
of information such that the followers can see in their news feeds. The users’
communication network is defined by a strongly connected digraph GC in which
i©→ j© means j is a follower of i or j receives xi in his news feed. We also assume
a strongly connected interference digraph GI to show the influence of the users
on the others. We assume that each user i’s cost function is not only dependent
on the users he follows, but also by the users that his followers follow.
The cost function of user i is denoted by Ji and consists of three parts:
1. Ci(xi): A cost that user i pays to produce xi unit of information.
Ci(xi) := hixi,
where hi > 0 is a user-specific parameter.
2. f1i (x): A differentiable, increasing and concave utility function of user i from
receiving information from his news feed with f1i (0) = 0.
f1i (x) := Li
√ ∑
j∈N inC (i)
qjixj ,
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where qji represents follower i’s interest in user j’s information and Li > 0
is a user-specific parameter.
3. f2i (x): An incremental utility function that each user i obtains from receiv-
ing attention in his network with f2i (x)|xi=0 = 0. Specifically, this function
targets the amount of attention that each follower pays to the information
of other users in his news feed.
f2i (x) =
∑
l:i∈N inC (l)
Ll
(√ ∑
j∈N inC (l)
qjlxj −
√ ∑
j∈N inC (l)\{i}
qjlxj
)
.
In fact, f2i (x) computes the total profit of the followers of user i from receiv-
ing information from the users excluding i and subtract it from the one that
includes i.
The total cost function for user i is then Ji(x) = Ci(xi)− f1i (x)− f2i (x). For
this example, we consider 5 users in the social media whose network of followers
GC is given in Fig. 2. (a). From GC and taking Ji into account, one can construct
GI (Fig. 2. (b)) in a way that the interferences among users are specified. Note
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Fig. 1: (a) GC (b) GI .
that this is a reverse process of the one discussed in [5] because GC is given as the
network of followers and GI is constructed from GC . For the particular networks
in Fig. 2, assumptions in [5] hold. We then employ the algorithm in [5] to find
an NE of this game for hi = 2 and Li = 1.5 for i ∈ V , and q41 = q45 = 1.75,
q32 = q43 = 2 and the rest of qij = 1.
1.2 Analysis
In this section we analyze the NE x∗ = [0, 0, 0.42, 2.24, 0.14]T . One can realize
that from GC in Fig. 2 (a), user 4 has 3 followers (users 1, 3 and 5), user 3 has 2
followers (users 2 and 5) and the rest has only 1 follower. It is straightforward to
predict that users 4 and 3 could draw more attentions due to their more number
of followers which is end up having less cost. This let them to produce more
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Fig. 2: Convergence of the unit of information that each user produces to a NE
over GC .
information (x∗4 ≥ x∗3 ≥ x∗j∈{1,2,5}). On the other hand, user 5 receives x4 and
x3 from his news feed which ends up having greater payoff than users 1 and 2
from perceiving information. This is why x∗5 ≥ x∗j∈{1,2}.
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